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ABSTRACT 
 
Trans-Atlantic elements in the Domestic policy attitudes of the British 
and American Conservative Movements,1980-1990. 
 
This paper explores the relationship between British and American Conservative 
activists during the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
dominated the politics of their respective countries. It does so mainly via looking 
at the most popular right-wing magazines in either country at the time; The 
Spectator and National Review.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Liberal International? The American takeover of London’s Spectator 
newspaper, 1859-1861. 
This paper casts a critical eye on the few previous histories of this period in the 
history of London’s The Spectator newspaper; a brief two years when it was 
owned edited by Americans working for the Buchanan administration in London. 
It goes on to attempt to analyse what the paper in the period reveals about 
similarities in British and American politics and about relations between the 
British Liberal and American Democratic parties.  
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1 
Intellectual Biography 
For my first research paper on The Atlantic World I struggled to pick a topic at 
first. The focus of Atlantic history seemed to be on cultural practices and relations 
rather than the directly political history which I am most interested in. 
Furthermore, the nature of Atlantic History seems to lead historians of the field to 
analyse the period of colonisation and the early stages of independent nations in 
the New world. This did not fit well with my passion for twentieth century politics. 
However, after discussion with Dr Aubert it became apparent that a paper which 
focused on modern Anglo-American politics was within the scope of the research 
paper.  
Early on I realised that I wanted the focus of my paper to be conservatism. 
Political ideology fascinates me. For my undergraduate research I attempted to 
analyse the ideology of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia during the 1950s and 
60s. A major aspect of this was attempting to establish what being a 
“conservative” meant in the period, and whether Russell fit into such a definition. 
It was when studying Russell that I first used National Review as a historical 
source. Having spent this time focusing on a conservative figure, as well as much 
more time on both Reagan and Thatcher’s governments than others, I was far 
more aware of the history of conservative rather than socialist or liberal ideology.  
My experience was not the sole reason for my decision. Much of contemporary 
political science and political history focuses on Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher. Historians of both America and Britain identify them as having caused 
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great change in their respective countries and around the world. In addition, the 
idea of the “special relationship” was reinforced by the closeness of the two 
leaders and their similar ideological vision. Indeed, the 1980s were unique in how 
similarly the British and American heads of government saw the world. The 
emergence of the conservative “New Right” as the dominant political force 
happened at the same time in both nations, and there is significant if not 
substantial historical literature on this development. Given that I had decided I 
wanted to compare British and American political ideology, conservatism in the 
1980s emerged as a topic of interest.  
It was apparent to me that it would be almost impossible to offer any fresh 
research on Thatcher and Reagan based on the amount of investigation there 
has already been, as well as time and source constraints. What has been less 
closely examined is the movement (the “Conservative Movement”) which 
Thatcher and Reagan were figureheads of. At first I had the idea of exploring the 
origins of the movement in the late 60s and early 70s, perhaps drawing on some 
my past investigation into Richard Russell, before an analysis of how the 
movement developed once it gained power through the 1980s. I considered 
drawing upon an array of private think-tanks, academics, as well as political 
journals and magazines. It became apparent however, that this was far too broad 
for the research paper. Thus it had to be narrowed down to the 1980s. This was 
the period when there was most clearly a New Right in both nations that could be 
compared and contrasted.  
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The mass of sources meant the project remained unfeasible. Comparing the New 
Right as a whole in Britain and the United States would be worthy of a 
monograph at least. The history that has been written of the non-politicians of the 
New Right has often focused on think-tanks. That fact, combined with ease of 
access to sources, meant that I decided popular right-wing publications were the 
best thing for me to research. By comparing similar newspapers in either country 
I could get a sense of what typical “New Right” attitudes were. The Spectator and 
National Review were by far the most popular right-wing weekly political 
publications in Britain and America respectively. They could thus serve as useful 
gauges of popular opinion amongst the New Right.  
My paper focused primarily on comparing the ideology evident in these two 
newspapers. What it found was a large degree of overlap on both economic (free 
market, competition and fiscal policy) and social issues. The papers were broadly 
shared an ideological outlook which combined historically liberal economics 
focusing on freedom with a traditional outlook on social issues. Crucially, the 
economic arguments centred around the justness of competition and the freedom 
to act in the market. In addition, the justification for socially conservative policies 
was rarely seen by the authors of the magazines as anti-freedom. Rather, 
arguments were constructed in a way which suggested that the constraints they 
wanted on certain practices was not about governmental regulation, but 
supposedly the avoidance of privileging certain people and practices. As such 
there was a clear ideological thread used to justify economic and social policy in 
both countries.  
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Probably what was most striking was just how similar the ideological case made 
in both newspapers was. The “Special Relationship” was reflected at the 
grassroots level as well as the governmental. In addition, it was interesting to 
discover evidence of common influences on the New Right on either side of the 
Atlantic from Neoliberal academics and economists.  
My paper gives a snapshot rather than a clear picture of the New Right due its 
relatively narrow focus. If I were to expand on it, I would try and consider think-
tanks and policy advisors as well as more newspapers. In order to improve the 
paper as it is I would expand the newspapers used as sources. I had planned to 
use Britain’s Salisbury Review and The Wall Street Journal as well. However, 
once I did so it became apparent that The Wall Street Journal was far more 
consistently liberal in its outlook than the other papers. It shared a passion for the 
free market, but this was largely unmitigated by conservative attitudes. I felt 
therefore that it would not make for a fair trans-Atlantic comparison so dropped it. 
To improve my paper, I would like to consider The Wall Street Journal, the 
Salisbury Review and other papers. I would attempt to draw out the differences 
evident in the magazines and attempt to explore what these differences might 
mean, and whether they are different in either country.  
I was far less clear on a topic for my second research paper on the Early 
American Republic. Beyond one class in my freshman year of undergraduate 
studies on American expansion, it was a period I had not studied at either school 
or university. It also lay outside of my favoured twentieth century period.   
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I decided that I wished to continue to analyse political ideology. Having used the 
press as evidence in my first paper, it also seemed sensible to continue down 
that path. After my first paper it felt to me that a newspaper was an excellent and 
efficient way to study a large number of policy opinions and an overall ideology. If 
one can locate copies of the paper easily it also reduces the need to go to an 
archive or research primary sources so extensively. In addition, having focused 
so much on conservative politics I decided I should do if not the opposite, then 
different politics. As such liberalism emerged as the ideology to study and in the 
American context the Democrats as the party to look at.  
At first I wished to do a similar analysis to my first paper, but focusing only on 
one country rather than a trans-Atlantic approach. I had the idea of seeking out a 
strongly pro-Democratic newspaper from the 1850s and using it as a lens to 
judge the political ideology of the Democrats in the era. However, speaking to Dr 
Grasso he suggested that such history had been well covered.  
Lacking a clear topic, my attention turned to The Spectator.  Having used it as a 
major source in my first paper I knew it had once been a very liberal newspaper. I 
was also aware that the London paper had for a period been taken over by 
Buchananite Democrats. Having been so little covered by historians, this seemed 
like a viable source to focus on for the research paper. I was hopeful that I would 
find clear evidence both of Democratic and (British) Liberal Party ideology in the 
paper, and evidence for how similar their respective ideologies were. In addition, 
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I hoped that there might be some historical significance to be drawn upon 
regarding the effort by Americans to control a British newspaper.  
As it turned out, my research topic was not greatly illuminating. My hope for 
evidence of ideological overlap was met, but little of the paper presented 
anything new on the topic. It seemed to confirm ideas which have been 
expressed previously, especially by R. Kelley. The analysis of the newspaper 
itself was interesting both to write and to do the research for. However, my 
conclusion was that the paper was relatively insignificant. It was a remarkable 
and unique incidence but there is little evidence either of any input from senior 
statesman or that the paper had much influence on British attitudes to America. 
Thus interesting as the paper was to research, it was somewhat lacking in 
research which offered historically significant new opinions.  
If I were to expand the paper, I would borrow an idea from my first paper and 
compare it directly to an American newspaper of the same era. This would create 
a broader scope with which to analyse the nature of American and Democratic 
party ideology. I would also consider comparing it in depth to other British Liberal 
papers of the time rather than merely in passing. Researching another paper in 
depth may reveal differences in The Spectator’s coverage which were not 
apparent by focusing so squarely on it alone. I would also in the future consider 
certain questions which my research brought up. Why did laissez-faire attitudes 
take over these two political parties and not other ones? Why was the American 
Republican Party so much more evangelical than the British Conservative Party? 
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Was the American Whig Party like the British Tory Party, or did Whigs merely 
admire Britain’s apparently more aristocratic society?  
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Trans-Atlantic elements in the Domestic policy attitudes of the British and 
American Conservative Movements, 1980-1990. 
 
The rise of the Conservative Movement was the defining feature of both 
American and British politics in the final quarter of the twentieth century. The rise 
of the so-called “New Right” was so critical because it marked such a sea-
change from the prevailing generally moderate trend of conservative politics in 
these 2 nations. Both the Republican Party in the United States and the 
Conservative Party in the United Kingdom had shifted towards a more moderate 
platform in the decades following World War Two. Most significantly, Social 
Democratic economic policies which used the power of government in a bid both 
to boost the economy, and to make society more equal, had been tacitly 
accepted in both countries.  
Therefore, the subsequent rise of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to the 
leadership of these two parties was indicative of radical transformation in right-
wing politics in both countries. This paper will attempt to analyse more broadly 
the “Movements” of which Thatcher and Reagan were the figureheads, and how 
these movements related to one another rather than focusing on Reagan and 
Thatcher themselves.  It will also seek to gauge how connected the ideas of the 
New Right in Britain and America were.   
It would be wrong to suggest that attention has not been paid by historians to 
either the Conservative Movement or to the Thatcher-Reagan relationship. Most 
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notably, a seminal work was published in 2012 by James Cooper in which he 
argues that bonds of personality and similarities in rhetoric were more in 
evidence than actual policy similarities.1 Yet for the most part historians have yet 
to analyse the Conservative Movement in a trans-Atlantic context. Cooper’s work 
touches on the “New Right” but is above all a focus on the two leaders. Similar 
analysis by political historians of political figures, parties and institutions in the 
late 1970s and ‘80s has tended to focus on either the United Kingdom or United 
States. The best example of a comprehensive study of the Conservative 
Movement is George Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America 
since 1945.2 When a more international approach has been taken, such as that 
of Mirowski and Plehwe,3 it has mostly focused specifically on neoliberal 
economics than on Conservatism as a whole. Their work is also more about the 
early growth of neoliberal ideas in the mid twentieth century than its application in 
the latter part.  
Atlantic history has generally speaking avoided history this recent. Indeed, whilst 
Atlantic historians aim to take an approach which allows them to examine events, 
interactions and perspectives beyond current or past national frameworks,4 the 
chronological shifts in the New World seem to have had a great influence on 
                                                           
1  James Cooper, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan: A Very Political Special Relationship 
(2012). 
2 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (2006).  
3 P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe (eds.), The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of Neoliberal 
Thought Collective (Cambridge, MA, 2009).  
4 David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History” in David Armitage and Michael J.Braddick, 
eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (2002), 13-14.  
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them. Relatively little attention is granted beyond the early nineteenth century 
and the emergence of independent states across the Americas.5 However, in 
some ways this limited focus of Atlantic history plays to the advantage of this 
paper. It allows for some of the historiographical concepts beloved by Atlanticists 
to be deployed within a new framework.  
The consistency of Anglo-American political interaction during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries is significant, because it ensured that there was a consistent 
closeness between the United Kingdom and United States. This closeness was 
reflected in the political developments of the eighties; the USA and UK were the 
world’s only major powers where spending did not rise as proportion of GDP. 
Thus, whilst it is common to suggest that neoliberalism has been adopted in part 
by all countries in the entire West in the past thirty years, the UK and US were 
the starting places for that development.  This, combined with the cultural 
similarities of the two nations, makes investigating connections in political 
ideology worthwhile.  
The term conservative is one which can be hard to define. Given the centre-right 
party in the United Kingdom is called the Conservatives, are they not all 
conservatives? The Democrats from the southern United States who opposed 
segregation were regularly labelled conservatives, yet it would be wrong to see 
Richard Russell Jr and Ronald Reagan as coming from the same political 
                                                           
5 For instance, the articles featured in the Princeton Companion to Atlantic History (2015, 
Princeton University Press) are on the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
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tradition. The term “Movement Conservative” was adopted by some political 
commentators to refer to Goldwater supporters in the sixties but given that 
association, and its lack of relevance to the UK, it does not seem appropriate 
either. Instead, this paper will utilise the terms of one of its subjects, William 
Buckley Jr. Buckley distinguished between people who were broadly right of 
centre, and those whom he supported and were part of what would become 
known as the New Right via use of the capital “C.” Thus Gerald Ford and Michael 
Heseltine were conservatives, whereas Jesse Helms and Margaret Thatcher 
were Conservatives.  
A monograph or even a doctorate which sought to investigate trans-Atlantic 
aspects of the Conservative Movement would have a vast range of sources to 
work with, ranging from think-tank publications to letters to representatives from 
constituents. This paper, whilst considering governmental policy, will focus 
heavily on two sources; the American Conservative magazine National Review 
and London’s Spectator. It will attempt to use the two periodicals as a lens to 
view the wider Conservative Movement. The aforementioned William Buckley 
founded National Review in 1955 and according to Nash, the impact of the 
magazine cannot be understated.6 National Review was not merely a 
Conservative weekly; in many ways it launched the Conservative Movement. The 
Spectator was less consistently Conservative as opposed to conservative, but by 
the election of Margaret Thatcher had become solidly so with Charles Moore as 
                                                           
6 Nash, The Intellectual Conservative Movement in America since 1945, 29. 
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editor. Crucially, these publications did not merely seek to talk to the public or 
commentators. An important aspect of their existence was efforts to actually 
influence policy.  
A case could be made that the Salisbury Review, founded in 1982, is more of a 
sister publication to National Review . However, drawing on another of Buckley’s 
tropes, namely that one should back the most Conservative viable candidate; this 
paper will mainly look at The Spectator owing to its more mainstream status in 
British journalism. In addition, The Spectator was at its most Conservative in the 
1980s with multi-millionaire Henry Keswick, husband of the head of one of the 
New Right’s most significant think-tanks (The Centre for Policy Studies), as 
owner.  The Spectator reached the British right in the same way as National 
Review did the American in terms of numbers, unlike the Salisbury Review.7 
Furthermore, both National Review and The Spectator had the ability to attract 
almost any Conservative to write for them, including both Thatcher and Reagan. 
The centrality of these magazines to Conservatism in either country, combined 
with their weekly publication, makes them excellent sources from which to draw 
ideas about the nature of trans-Atlantic Conservatism.  
How does looking at separate British and American weeklies allow for an 
analysis of “trans-Atlantic elements?” There are three ways in which this analysis 
will offer insight into the trans-Atlantic connections. Firstly, the degree of interest 
                                                           
7 Indeed, there was a National Review piece in this period dedicated to the defence of the 
Salisbury Review (Joseph Sobran, “Mozart at the Piano”, National Review 38, no.10 (06/06, 
1986), 54-55.)  
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in and support for Conservative policies in the other country needs to be 
investigated. Evidence of such interest and support would highlight connections 
and echoes between the countries even if it does not prove genuine 
entanglements. Secondly, the level of similarity in the political attitudes of the 
newspapers will offer an insight into how connected Conservative political ideas 
were. Did they spring organically in each nation with common circumstances or 
were there common influences on the UK and US? Finally, and least significantly 
for this paper, actual entanglements between the governments of either country 
need to be briefly considered as they are the clearest instances of trans-Atlantic 
interaction, even if they are not necessarily reflective of Conservatism more 
broadly.  
Conservatism with a capital “C” in this period can be broadly grouped into three 
central themes. These three are nationalistic foreign policy, neoliberal economics 
and traditionalist conservative social attitudes. This paper will not consider 
foreign policy due to the saturation of analysis on the topic. Far more words have 
been dedicated to British and American foreign policy in this era than to 
connections between them domestically.  
  Within Neoliberal economics, supply-side economics in the form of reductions in 
tax and spending needs to be considered, alongside Conservative support for 
greater competition and opposition to privilege. How it is that these ideas were 
tied into the writings and beliefs of neoliberal intellectuals and academics is 
significant, and offers clear evidence for common influence on British and 
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American Conservatives. Given that the free market was the cornerstone on 
which the Conservative Movement was first built economics are crucial to this 
paper. What emerges is a predictable shared belief in the freedom of the 
individual at the expense of the state, and a sense of market competition as 
being both just and necessary. This latter point reflects a “bottom-up” attitude 
which focused on consumer choice, as opposed to a mere defence of the rights 
of the wealthy. Indeed, so significant was competition to Conservatives that the 
desire for competition had influence beyond economics in both labour relations 
and education.  
  The combination of traditionalist, Christian-based social values with 
neoliberalism was an element of what made the Conservative Movement 
distinctive and thus an analysis of Conservative views on social issues is 
necessary. This paper will look chiefly at the topics associated with the “sexual 
revolution”, namely gay rights, women’s rights and abortion.  What this 
demonstrates is that the focus on freedom in neoliberalism matched with 
traditional social ideas to create a form of Conservatism which opposed Rights-
Movements but supported basic rights. Cultural liberalism was resisted, but 
support for draconian legal restrictions on women or homosexuals were not 
present (though abortion was considered separately).  
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Conservatives and the free market revolution 
 A study of the Conservative Movement in a trans-Atlantic context must feature 
an attempt to examine actual entanglements between the major actors of the 
Movement on either side of the Atlantic. Given their positions as the figureheads 
of Conservatism on either side of the Atlantic, interactions between Thatcher and 
Reagan and their respective governments must thus be considered even in an 
analysis of the overall Movement such as this. This applies to the domestic 
issues of taxation and spending as much as it does foreign-policy. Whilst 
entanglements between the two were far more frequent over foreign-policy, 
economic ones are more significant as they are more unusual. 
 In order to determine whether an incident, interaction or similarity between the 
Thatcher and Reagan premierships is worth considering as an “entanglement” it 
seems appropriate to utilise the significance granted it by contemporary 
Conservative publications. As such, only a few of the numerous economic 
discussions and statements made by either side about the other will be 
considered here, but these incidents can speak for the period more broadly.  
 A National Review article on Thatcher’s premiership by Reagan himself 
demonstrates the significance shared economic values and policies had in 
strengthening his and Thatcher’s relationship.8 He writes glowingly of Thatcher’s 
transformation of the British economy and suggests that he felt particularly 
                                                           
8 Ronald Reagan. "Margaret Thatcher and the revival of the west.” National Review 41, no. 9 
(05/19, 1989): 21-22. 
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strongly about it because it mirrored what he wished to achieve in the United 
States. Indeed, he explicitly explains that he believes both he and Mrs Thatcher 
were able to influence each other’s economic policy and those of other countries 
such as Turkey and New Zealand, referring specifically to Thatcher’s 
privatisations of industry and his own 1981 tax cuts. It is also worth noting 
Reagan wrote this article in the middle of George H. W. Bush’s term as 
President, at a point where he was starting to turn away from the economic 
positions of the Reagan administration. Whilst certainty is impossible, there is a 
suggestion that the narrative picture Reagan paints is designed at least in part to 
contradict the more leftward policies of his predecessors and successor. The 
significance of internal division within right-wing parties to Conservatives will be 
considered in greater detail below.    
The idea that Thatcher’s pursuit of radical economic transformation of the United 
Kingdom influenced her American counterpart is supported by a 1983 “inside 
scoop” Wall Street Journal editorial. 9 It explains that Reagan’s closest and more 
conservative advisors have been pointing to Thatcher’s recent electoral success 
(in early June 1983 the Conservatives secured a landslide election victory) to 
ensure that Reagan sticks to his inclination to maintain his supply-side economic 
policies. This suggests that senior American Conservatives were inspired by their 
British counterparts, and also that Reagan himself placed relatively high priority 
on events in the UK. Furthermore, the editorial itself is very keen on the idea that 
                                                           
9 The editor, “Inside scoop: The Thatcher Precedent”, Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition (6/24/, 
1983): 9. 
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Thatcher’s success shows that right-wing economic policies have the benefit of 
being correct without the vice of bringing about electoral oblivion, suggesting that 
“only liberal American columnists” claim it is not worth comparing the United 
States and United Kingdom. British Conservatives also seem to have believed 
that they had some influence over economic policy, or at the very least wanted to 
have it. Within a week of each other Mrs Thatcher and her Chancellor Nigel 
Lawson managed to make front page headlines by calling on the United States to 
seek more fiscal discipline and reduce their deficit.10 
Yet entanglements between figures are by no means the only evidence for trans-
Atlantic influence and exchange in the economic ideas of the Conservative 
Movement. An analysis of the major conservative newspapers of the era from 
both the United States and United Kingdom shows great American and British 
conservative interest in each other’s economic policies. Indeed, it is striking how 
specific the interest is; there were more National Review articles featuring 
discussion of British economic policy than the rest of Western Europe 
combined.11 
 Similarly, The Spectator took a huge interest in Reagan’s economic policy, more 
than any other nation, which is particularly striking given Britain’s common EEC 
membership with most of the nations of Western Europe. Repeatedly, The 
                                                           
10 Anthony Lejeune, “Reagan and Thatcher: The Balance sheet,” National Review 40, no. 9 
(05/13, 1988): 36. 
11 Based on searching the EBSCO Host National Review Database for “Britain, or British, or UK” 
and “economics” versus “economics” and “France, West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Sweden.”  
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Spectator and Salisbury review editorials lavished praise on Reagan’s economic 
efforts, as did The National Review and Wall Street Journal on Thatcher. This 
seems in part to reflect a Conservative predilection for an Anglo-American 
alliance. As will be explored later in this paper, the 1980s was an age where this 
tendency manifested itself as strongly as it ever had done. 
 Specifically, the interest was in the policies pursued by Conservative 
governments. A review of the American economic coverage of British papers and 
vice-versa highlights how significant supply-side economics was to 
Conservatives in the eighties. Domestic pieces such as National Review ’s 1980 
recommendations for Reagan, in which it called for a twenty-five percent top rate 
of tax and a constitutional amendment to limit spending, were significant. 12 Yet 
the number of articles singing the praises of or calling for more supply-side 
economics in the other nation reveal that low taxes and spending were more than 
sensible policy to Movement Conservatives in the United Kingdom and United 
States. The Wall Street Journal ’s 1982 editorial in defence of Thatcher’s 
monetary reforms,13 or its 1985 decrying of the influence of “wets” in moderating 
Thatcher are excellent examples.14 So is The Spectator’s praise for the 1989 cut 
in the American capital gains tax-rate.15 Such promotions of supply-side 
economics show that not only did Conservatives want what they perceived to be 
                                                           
12 “Let’s see if it works”, National Review 32, no. 26 (12/31, 1980): 1548-1548.  
13 Editorial, Wall Street Journal, eastern edition, (09/20, 1982).   
14Irving Kristol, “The Old World Needs a New Ideology.” The Wall Street Journal, Eastern 
Edition (-03-06, 1985): 1. 
15 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, The Spectator, 1989.  
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best for their country, but also that they had a particular view of how societies 
ought to be ordered. It went beyond a belief in what was the best economic 
policy; they believed that the world would be a better place if personal income 
was greater and government income less.   
There was also major interest in the papers in opposition from within the right 
itself rather than from the left. Indeed, Anthony Lejeune, the National Review’s 
main British correspondent for much of the nineteen-eighties, dismissed Labour 
as an irrelevance in his 1988 review of Reagan and Thatcher’s premiership, 
emphasising that the opposition which mattered was predominantly from within 
the Tory party.16  
This is merely one example of a wider trend which applied in both directions 
across the Atlantic. Ambrose Rose-Pritchard’s aggressive attack on Republicans 
willing to compromise with Democrats over the budget in 1987 and 1990 
Spectator articles shows that economic interest, even criticism, was focused on 
fellow conservatives.17This focus highlights the Conservative Movement’s own 
revolutionary nature. Having fought so hard to displace the compromising, 
‘moderate’ economics of ‘patrician’ Tories in the United Kingdom and 
“Rockefeller” Republicans in the United States, in the 1980s New Right 
Conservatives were desperate to consolidate their position as the policy-makers 
on the right. They appeared to be more concerned about winning this battle of 
                                                           
16 Lejeune, “Reagan and Thatcher: The Balance Sheet,” 12. 
17 Ambrose Rose-Pritchard, “Can Reagan Add up,” The Spectator, (10/31,1987):9; James 
Bowman, “How to liberate the millions,” The Spectator, (2/10, 1990): 12.  
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ideas on the Right than they were about defeating the left. This engaged 
sympathy for fellow hard-line Conservatives across the Atlantic; conservatives 
saw their own battles reflected overseas. National Review’s Anthony Lejeune 
made explicit comparison between the “wets” and “Rockefeller Republicans” on a 
number of occasions, notably in his 1988 review.18 In part national context must 
also be considered. Praise was lavished on Thatcher’s neoliberal economic 
policies by National Review in 1983,19 the time when the primaries for the 1984 
US election were just beginning to take shape. Similarly, Thatcher’s decision to 
continue cutting taxes throughout her Premiership was emphasised by National 
Review in 1990 when Congress was pushing for tax rises. As noted in the 
introduction, these newspapers were set up to try and influence Conservative 
politicians as well as to commentate on them. The trend for mistrust of 
moderates on the other side of the Atlantic also reflects how powerful the trans-
Atlantic connection was for Conservatives in the 1980s.  
What this mistrust also reflects is the degree to which even amongst people who 
would normally be considered as true Conservatives, supply-side economics 
took a significant amount of time to become established. In the early 1980s a 
number of pieces were published calling supply-side ideas into question, often 
utilising H.W. Bush’s immortal phrase of “voodoo economics.” Arthur Slessinger’s 
1980 critique of Thatcherism in the Wall Street Journal   is a fine example. In his 
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piece he wrote of his worry that Reagan would follow Thatcher’s path of pursuing 
principled economic policy which causes undue pain to the economy. He went as 
far as to suggest that Thatcher was undermining British conservatism, writing, 
“the worship of abstract principles is surely the antithesis of the British 
Conservative tradition with its Burkean distrust of apriori theories.”20 Similarly, in 
The Spectator in late 1981 Rees-Mogg warned of monetarism driving the 
American economy into depression.21 The National Review London 
correspondent of 1980 and ‘81 gave monthly reports of how British Tories are 
attacking the “aggressive” capitalism being promoted by Mrs Thatcher. Yet by 
1982 these articles dry up. From around the re-election of Mrs Thatcher in 1983, 
the small numbers of criticisms that are offered about economic policy are 
attacks on moderation in the name of political expediency. 
These newspapers suggest that the economic attitudes of British and American 
Conservatives swung fully behind supply-side economics at a similar time. That 
this transformation happened in equal measure in the British and American 
newspapers provides support for the idea that the Conservative Movement had 
strong trans-national elements to it.  
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Conservatives, Competition and Choice. 
Linked to economics, but at least partially separated from beliefs on taxation and 
spending, was the fervent Conservative belief in competition and choice. Too 
often, neoliberal economics have been explained as the reduction in the power 
and size of the state and reductions in the individual tax burden. As stated in the 
last section of this paper, reducing taxes and state power was undoubtedly a 
goal not only of the Thatcher and Reagan governments, but of the New Right 
more broadly. Yet this is only part of the story of neoliberal economics. A belief in 
the moral correctness of competition, and conversely the wrongness of privilege, 
was one of the critical ways in which the economic beliefs of the New Right were 
‘New.’ In addition, this belief in competition and choice became a vital aspect of 
Conservative ideology, driving ideas about public policy in non-economic areas 
of social policy.  
Part of the reason that competition was such a significant element of 
Conservatism was the degree to which it had been discredited in the decades 
before the nineteen-eighties. There had been a vast state-entry into the 
marketplace and the presence of the state became the status quo. The power of 
this status-quo is reflected in the level of opposition to Thatcher and Reagan’s 
efforts to boost competition. It had become so tarred that the bulk of the left, as 
well as many members of centre-right parties (Mrs Thatcher felt compelled to 
sack half of her Cabinet within two years of taking office) became convinced that 
support for competition was akin to a wish to destroy the welfare state. This belief 
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did not simply disappear after 1980. In the UK the Church of England published 
the report Church and the City which suggested that competitive markets were 
leaving vast numbers to suffer. In the United States the mainstream press such 
as the New York Times regularly offered case-studies about increases in 
homelessness. It is important therefore to consider Conservative newspaper’s 
support for competition within the context of vast criticism from political, religious 
and lay elements of society. 
The significance of competition to the early neoliberal intellectuals of the Mont 
Pelerin Society was huge. The Mont Pelerin society in an international group of 
academics, economists and intellectuals set up in 1947 to discuss means of 
protecting human freedoms. In practice its focus is on free market economics 
and almost every prominent neoliberal thinker of the twentieth century was a 
member.  
Rather than the destruction of what came to be termed the “welfare state”, it was 
support for competition which was the most important idea to neoliberals. Ben 
Jackson’s research into the neoliberal thinkers of the mid-twentieth century has 
helped highlight this. He explains at length how it is wrong to suggest, as several 
historians have done22, that neoliberalism was about dismantling the welfare 
state. Their big concern was about reducing the encroachment of government, 
not in eliminating government. Indeed, Hayek and his companions agreed that a 
welfare system which sought marginal redistribution to the poorest in society was 
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necessary.23 It is easy to forget that Walter Lipmann, the American progressive, 
was a founding member of the Mont Pelerin society. Jackson suggests the 
neoliberal thinkers of the ‘40s and ‘50s were not “reactionary and negative,” and 
did not seek a return to nineteenth century laissez-faire economic policy. 24 He 
points to Jewkes’ attack on laissez-faire in his Ordeal by planning in which he 
suggests “the socialist attacks on the social rigidities and privileges of Victorian 
England were sound.”25 The key word in that sentence is planning and this paper 
will explore how neoliberal anti-privilege seeped into almost every element of 
New Right ideology, both at the top and in the magazines. 
Given the influence that these thinkers had on the New Right on either side of the 
Atlantic what they argued is of vital concern to this paper. Jackson subsequently 
suggested that this apparent moderation of the early academics was abandoned 
by the New Right in the 1970s and that they sought a more fundamental 
destruction of the welfare state that had been established following the Second 
World War.26 This is where his analysis must be challenged. One of the striking 
features of the Thatcher and Reagan governments was their willingness to allow 
welfare to continue much as it had been before. Under both of them welfare 
spending climbed by more than 10% during their time in office. Upon Mrs 
Thatcher’s death, the former Cabinet Minister Kenneth Clarke appeared on 
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television to suggest it was “ridiculous” to suggest the Thatcher government had 
attacked the welfare state.27Whilst some historians  have suggested this was a 
failure on their part28, this actually seems to show that the neoliberal 
governments of the 1980s followed their intellectual forebears in focusing on 
competitive practice and government efficiency rather than fundamental changes 
to the government’s welfare role. This attitude is reflected in the Conservative 
newspapers of the era, with very few attacks on the government of either country 
for not reducing the welfare bill. Indeed, the most notable area of comment on 
welfare in the Wall Street Journal or National Review is praise for the Wisconsin 
Governor Tommy Thompson’s W2 welfare programme. Thompson’s program 
actually raised the cost of welfare, but it altered the system in a manner that 
compelled people to work for their benefits. Here, we see the Conservative love 
of competition at work. The great goal of this reform and its subsequent 
descendants such as the New York program was to ensure that people were not 
dis-incentivised from working.   
The influence of neoliberal economists such as Friedman and Hayek on 
governments is beyond doubt; both were recruited as advisors by Thatcher and 
Reagan. The 1980s articles in The Spectator and National Review show that the 
Conservative Movement as a whole was heavily influenced by them. A search for 
abstracts featuring “Hayek” brings up more than 100 articles in both of these 
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magazines,29 as well as over a thousand mentions in the Wall Street Journal.  
The National Review’s Dinesh D’Souza actually has a 1989 article in which he 
heaps praise on the neoliberal economists and complains about them not having 
enough influence on government policy.30 The commonality of influence of these 
neoliberal academics to Britain and America further highlights the strength of 
trans-Atlantic entanglements in the Conservative Movement. Indeed, the Mont 
Pelerin society was made up mainly from British and American based 
academics, ensuring trans-Atlantic exchanges of ideas; exchanges which would 
in later decades come to greatly influence the Conservative Movement.  
Competition was a major neoliberal concern because, Jackson surmises, it was 
vital from the perspective of freedom that people be allowed “to make rational 
choices on an individual basis.”31 Choice was seen as a crucial element of 
freedom and competition was necessary to ensure choice. Neoliberals wanted to 
maximise competition not merely because it was felt to be the best guarantor of 
economic growth, but because it guaranteed freedom. Jackson summaries 
neoliberal economics as being “a critique of the threat to freedom posed by the 
encroaching power of the state”32 and that power undermined competition. It is 
also significant that support for competition was not merely a call for the state to 
reduce its power. Rougier described his “true liberalism” as a creed where the 
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government offered each ‘driver’ the Highway Code, in contrast to socialism 
which ordered drivers where to drive and “Manchester liberalism” which offered 
no code.33 In this context, it is possible to see how apparently anti-intervention 
Conservative could introduce government regulation in industries which had 
never seen it before.  
A large element of New Right support for competition was support for the 
reduction of government involvement in private sector trade. At a government 
level Reagan and Thatcher sought to eliminate price-controls and instead allow 
prices to fluctuate freely. A National Review article had actually called on Reagan 
to eliminate numerous price controls including on gasoline as early as his 
election in 1980.34Similarly, from a neoliberal perspective the cuts to various 
forms of income tax were in part a means of boosting choice. Less taxation 
meant the individual was freer to pursue his goals; he had greater choice. These 
ambitions were almost universally supported by the Conservative commentariat. 
Indeed, The Spectator attacked the Democratic Party on two key Conservative 
bugbears in 1987, suggesting that their tax policy was designed to enforce “a 
form of state enforced equality which reduces competition.”35 Later the same 
year, The Spectator’s Washington correspondent Ambrose Rose-Pritchard wrote 
of his frustrations at the rise in support for protectionism amongst Congressional 
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Democrats, claiming that it undermined competition. 36 The best reflection of New 
Right support for competition within the newspapers examined in this paper was 
Michael E. Porter’s article explaining why competition was a great thing both for 
the nation and even from the perspective of individual businesses. 37 
Privatisation was an issue around which Conservatives congregated in this 
period. It was an enormous issue in British politics, making it unsurprising how 
much support is expressed for it on the pages of The Spectator and Salisbury 
Review. Yet it also features heavily in American commentary, much beyond mere 
reports of what the Thatcher government are doing. This reflects once again the 
level of trans-Atlantic interest in Conservative economics and the power of New 
Right ideology to transcend national boundaries (in certain contexts). 
Significantly, a huge aspect of Conservative support for privatisation came from 
the belief that it would create competition and boost the competitiveness of 
struggling factories, dockyards and mines. Buckley spoke happily as late as 1990 
of how the privatisation of a Belfast shipyard had seen it record its first year of 
profit in fourteen years.38  
The large government monopolies in utilities were attacked not merely for being 
nationalised, but also for being monopolies. Indeed, some of the criticism of the 
way in which British industry was privatised shows how critical a consideration 
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competition was to Conservatives. The Spectator’s Martin Ivens specifically 
asked in 1987 “What has it [privatisation] done to widen consumer choice…. 
what has it done to improve completion?” 39 To Ivens, simply removing things 
from the government was not the aim of privatisation. He pointed to the sell-off of 
British gas as one unit as a particularly heinous example of monopoly being 
preserved, contrasting it with the competition of the US regional companies. The 
Wall Street Journal expressed similar concerns about British privatisation a year 
earlier in an article entitled “Tory Paradox.” 40 This rampant opposition to 
monopolies amongst Conservatives had its roots as far back as the 18th century, 
but the summary of the mid-twentieth century neoliberal Henry Simons that “the 
great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms” helps to establish what a 
crucial idea this was within neoliberal economics.41  
This opposition to Monopoly was reflective of another critical element of 
Conservative support for competition, which was that competition was anathema 
to privilege. In the United States both left and right had long portrayed 
themselves as opponents of privilege, but in the United Kingdom this had been 
far less true on the right (and it could be argued, and was by the New Right, on 
the left). A National Review article at the end of Mrs Thatcher’s final government 
reserved particular praise for the way that competition had been injected back 
into Britain at the expense of permanent privileges for the rich and Trade Unions. 
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It noted with pleasure how “She has persuaded people that there is no virtue in a 
badly run business”, praising how competition in enterprise was no longer seen 
as an ill in the United Kingdom.42 Indeed, the same article suggested that 
American Conservatives feel that American “enterprise culture” has spread to the 
UK and assails privilege as the enemy of competition and “just” economics. 
Bethell notes how Thatcher receives criticism from the left for her “replacement of 
socialist privilege.” Critically, he also emphasises how Thatcherite economics has 
displeased moderate, traditionalist conservatives such as Quintin Hogg and the 
former Prime Minister Harold MacMillan. He suggests that the key reason for 
criticism of Thatcher from both left and right is her assault on their privileges. The 
“encroachment of the market economy” upsets many in “a country where the 
advocacy of one variety of privilege (Tory) or another (Labour-Trade Union) 
usually predominates.”43  
The praise offered by American Conservatives to British competition provides yet 
further evidence for trans-Atlantic interests amongst Conservatives. Furthermore, 
Bethell’s description of the promotion of free market competition at the expense 
of privilege as the introduction of an “American market order” offers an insight 
into how American Conservatives viewed privilege as a British trait.  
Opposition to privilege and belief in competition were also crucial aspects of 
Conservative opposition to the power of Trade Unions. Tom Bethell’s use of the 
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term “socialist privilege” is far from unique and this phrase is helpful in 
understanding how Conservative opposition to trade-unions was not purely 
partisan. 44They were not merely opposed to trade-unions because they were 
left-wing groups; they saw the Trade-Unions as giving out special privileges to 
their members, and in doing so denying free market competition. A Spectator 
article from the early 1980s attacks “closed shop” arrangements in both the 
British legal system and the City of London, suggesting that this presents an 
unfair barrier to entry and undermines consumer choice.45 Paul Johnson attacked 
a similar situation amongst the printers of Fleet Street, decrying “That great 
social evil, the closed shop.” 46 Indeed, Johnson emphasises the connection 
between a lack of competition and Union power, suggesting that the Fleet Street 
closed shop “is a form of monopoly achieved by coercion.” Anti-Unionism was 
similarly strong in American Conservative circles; there were almost as many 
articles dedicated to the (perceived) Union scourge in National Review in the ‘80s 
as there were in The Spectator. For example, in 1986 National Review ’s The 
Week heaped praise on the fact the National Labor Board had suggested some 
work could be shifted from unionised to non-unionised workers, saying 
“Americans have more choice, and unions can’t handle it.”47 As with its British 
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counterpart, National Review ’s opposition to Unions stemmed above all from its 
support for greater competition.  
Trade Unionism is an area of policy where these newspapers offer relatively little 
in the way of trans-Atlantic opinions. Nonetheless, it remains important to this 
analysis for two reasons. Firstly, the similarity of approach needs to be 
recognised. Secondly, Trade Union policy is significant because it demonstrates 
how important competition and opposition to privilege were to Conservatives in 
this era. Arguments made about Unions in National Review and The Spectator 
were consistent with the broader arguments made about competition and as 
such show how similar this element Conservative ideology was on either side of 
the Atlantic. From this one can extrapolate the common influence of the 
neoliberal thinkers mentioned above.   
Labour relations, whilst not strictly economic, serve a chiefly economic purpose. 
Education on the other hand is certainly a social rather than economic area of 
policy. That it too was impacted by the Conservative faith in competition is further 
evidence of how powerful this idea was. In the United Kingdom, the Assisted 
Places Scheme was introduced by the Thatcher government in 1980. Rather 
than being compelled to attend their local state-run Comprehensive School, 
pupils whose parents could not afford to send them to private schools had their 
fees totally or partially paid for by the government if they finished in the top fifteen 
percent of the entrance exam. It was a minor reform in terms of numbers, with an 
average of around 6,000 pupils per year affected. Yet, the Assisted Places 
33 
 
Scheme was more significant than the numbers affected both because it allowed 
parents greater choice in education, and because it marked a clear break with 
the previous trend of more Comprehensive schools. Competition was reflected 
not merely in greater choice for the individual; the practice of rewarding the top 
performing pupils with better schooling made the process of school choice itself 
more competitive. The Scheme had wide-ranging support in The Spectator.48  
In the United States a similar scheme in Wisconsin, like the W2 welfare program 
introduced by Conservative Tommy Thompson, received huge support in 
National Review based for most part on support for greater competition in 
schools. National Review’s support for the scheme mostly took the form of 
attacks on the teaching Unions and liberal commentators that opposed it, with 
the accusation being that “The protestations...are perversely procedural and self-
protective.”49 It goes on to suggest that the government should not have a 
monopoly on “public good” and that the public schools “fear the idea that people 
should have a choice.” 
It is noticeable how little role race played in this particular debate over school 
choice. In the United States, unlike the United Kingdom, non-comprehensive 
education gained an association with segregation owing to the suggestion by 
some segregationists in the 1960s that allowing people to choose which schools 
they sent their children to offered a way to avoid public school desegregation. Yet 
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the National Review was not reacting to claims that the new Wisconsin scheme 
was racist. It actually had relatively high support amongst liberal black legislators 
because the provision which meant it aided only poor children meant it 
disproportionately affected black families. Furthermore, because Milwaukee 
(where the big majority of Wisconsin’s black population lived) was one of the 
United States’ most residentially segregated cities, the school vouchers system 
could not be interpreted as means of allowing white people to avoid sending their 
children to schools with high minority populations. The residential segregation 
meant that the desegregation of public schools had very little impact (black 
neighbourhoods had schools with almost entirely black student-bodies and vice-
versa).  
The basis of both British and American Conservative support for such schemes 
was how they encouraged greater competition. Significantly, this was not done 
through cuts to government funding for education provision. Rather, it was that 
the funds were used in a manner which emphasised individual choice over that of 
the governments. This is further vindication of Jackson’s argument that 
neoliberalism was not merely a creed which set out to remove the state. Rather, 
it was about controlling the state’s centralising and anti-liberal tendencies.  
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Conservatives and the Sexual Revolution 
A consideration of domestic aspects of American and British Conservatism must 
also examine Conservative attitudes towards social issues. Indeed, it seems that 
alongside foreign policy, it was the traditionalist social attitudes of Conservative 
Movement acolytes and intellectuals which ensured the “Conservative 
Movement” was about more than neoliberal economics in both the United 
Kingdom and United States.  
 Historians of American Conservatism have granted far more prominence to 
social issues such as women’s rights, gay rights, minority rights and law and 
order than their British counterparts. The American “culture wars”, the battle 
between right and left over social issues, have had much material devoted to 
them.50 There is not a comparable tone on the history of the British right’s social 
attitudes, though Michael McManus’ recent book on the Conservative Party and 
homosexuality has offered greater insight into attitudes to gay rights.51  However, 
as with so much of the existing literature on British Conservatism in this period, it 
revolves specifically around the Tory Party rather than right-wing politics more 
broadly.  
The issues grouped under the “sexual revolution” are women’s rights, gay rights 
and abortion. This area of analysis differs from the previous areas of supply-side 
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economics and competition. Unlike in those areas, there are very few examples 
of American articles discussing the British government’s social policies or vice-
versa. Indeed, there are relatively few in either newspaper relating to the policies 
pursued by their own government. This seems to reflect two important factors. 
Firstly, social issues were more culturally than policy-based to Conservatives in 
the 1980s. They held power in both nations, but beyond minor reforms their chief 
goal was to resist left-wing pressure for legislative reform. This meant in 
particular that foreign newspapers commented a comparatively small amount on 
social issues in other countries. The majority of foreign coverage in either the 
National Review or The Spectator was dedicated to analysing actual government 
policy. Secondly, and equally importantly, it seems to highlight how much less 
revolutionary and remarkable Reagan and Thatcher’s social policies were than 
their economic policies. Their economic policies, whilst coming in for occasional 
criticism in Conservative newspapers for being too moderate, were such a break 
with what had come before that they were always comment-worthy. By contrast, 
the social policies pursued were unremarkable to the Conservatives who 
dominated these newspapers.  
This relative lack of direct interest in the policies of the other nation does not 
mean that the social attitudes of these papers are insignificant to a Trans-Atlantic 
history of the New Right. In Cooper’s comparison of Thatcher and Reagan he 
notes that different “national contexts” meant the ‘trans’ element of his ‘trans-
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Atlantic’ history was partially limited. 52 Similarly, it is possibly fair to suggest that 
the actual transfer of social attitudes across the Atlantic in this context was not 
major. Nevertheless, the similarly traditionalist Conservative social attitudes 
expressed in both The Spectator and National Review show the significance of 
the connection between the United Kingdom and United States. That 
Conservatives in both nations pursued neoliberal economics alongside traditional 
Conservative attitudes towards family life, gay rights and abortion imply that the 
neoliberal intellectuals who inspired the New Right had a similar effect in both 
Britain and America. 
Indeed, it is remarkable how in spite of significant differences in the two 
countries, there was a striking similarity in the attitudes towards the “sexual 
revolution” expressed in their respective chief Conservative periodicals, The 
Spectator and National Review. America was the more religious country by far in 
the eighties, church-attendance being more than twice as common.53 Williams 
follows much American historiography of the ‘culture wars’ when he suggests 
that they emerged owing to the remarkable religiosity of the United States and 
the subsequent impact this had on the Right. If National Review alone expressed 
robustly Conservative opinions on social issues then this thesis would carry more 
weight, but the similarity of opinions in it to those in The Spectator suggests it is 
somewhat lacking. Despite the different cultural contexts in Britain and America, 
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there was major alignment amongst Conservatives on attitudes around the 
sexual revolution and this is further evidence of trans-Atlantic connections within 
the Conservative Movement.  
The phrase “traditional Conservative” would be a reasonably accurate term to 
describe the attitudes of both the British and American New Right to the sexual 
revolution. However, this is in need of a qualification. The phrase could imply that 
New Right social attitudes were at odds with a more ‘liberal’ economic attitude. 
Rather, the study of the contemporary Conservative newspapers suggests that 
whilst they had a traditionalist outlook to questions of the place of women or 
wrongness of homosexuality, they separated their disapproval from clear policy 
proposals. Thus in the view of Conservatives, their “toleration” of groups such as 
homosexuals ensured a consistent valuing of freedom.  
Within the New Right, traditional ideas relating to the family remained strong and 
women’s rights campaigns were looked upon unfavourably. Gilder offered a 
stringent defence of the traditional role of the family in society in his 1986 article 
in National Review. He associates “feminists” and the “contemporary sexual 
liberal’s goal of reproduction and the associated tasks becoming a societal rather 
than particularly female role with the Marxist aim of society taking on the “general 
production.”54 He emphasises the importance of mothers and makes the claim 
that “The prisons, reformatories, foster homes, mental institutions and welfare 
rolls of American already groan under the burden of children relinquished to 
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‘society’ to raise and support.” 55 In addition, Gilder attempts to combat the 
arguments of Betty Freidan that women need greater opportunity. He quotes a 
pair of sociological studies in the late ‘70s which suggested that suburban 
housewives were amongst the least isolated Americans.56  
The New Right’s conceptualisation of women’s rights campaigners as a left-wing 
special interest is made clearer still in a mocking two-line National Review article 
from 1985, in which the author suggests female affirmative action for the best 
looking women (this being based on a study which found “beautiful women do 
less well than plain ones in the higher echelons of business.”57 This anti-feminist 
attitude is even clearer in The Spectator. Richard West writes numerous articles 
of a similar vein to Gilder’s in the National Review, notably one where he jokes 
that for British feminists “Not a day passes...without…. the production of new 
sociological evidence of the nastiness of men.”58 Auberon Waugh is equally as 
forthright in his protests against the “women’s rights lobby”, calling for all the 
feminist “public bodies” to merge into the “National Organisation of 
Madwomen.”59  
Yet the articles on women’s Rights cannot be entirely summed up as male 
attacks. There were several female writers at The Spectator decrying the 
perceived extremism of the Women’s Right’s campaigns. One of them, Vicki 
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Woods, had an article which matches up closely to Gilder’s in National Review. 
Like Gilder, Woods decries the decline of the family, pointing out that 85% of 
divorced mothers will be on state benefits. Indeed, she explicitly lays blame for 
the decline of the family and the blow this has caused children of divorce on the 
“sexual revolution.”60 
The attitudes expressed in British and American Conservative newspapers on 
gay rights are almost identical. Of all areas, the articles focusing on homosexuals 
most highlight the New Right combination of a small-statist attitude with fervent 
moral beliefs. Two themes emerge; the Conservative emphasis on tolerance of 
homosexuals as opposed to acceptance, and their hatred for the “gay lobby.”  
Tolerance is the overriding theme in both The Spectator and National Review. 
The difference between tolerance and acceptance is spelt out a number of times. 
The Spectator suggests “it is odious for the law to punish homosexual acts 
between consenting adults in private” but that this does not mean that 
homosexuality is `valid' or even admirable.”61 Auberon Waugh, a stringent anti-
homosexual, also calls for tolerance in The Spectator by attacking those calling 
for all clergy to have to reveal their homosexuality even when it is not interfering 
with work.62  
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Such sentiments are reflected in Short’s National Review piece in which he 
argues that the left have determined one needs to declare one’s sexuality in a bid 
to “politicize the bedroom” and tried to redefine tolerance as approval.”63 Short 
argues that these efforts explain why no Conservative could support the “gay 
rights movement”; he believes it is an attack both on privacy and sexual morality. 
Evidently, the Conservative conception of freedom prized the right of individuals 
to discriminate and suggested the government must merely tolerate, rather than 
accept minority groups such as homosexuals.  
Writing as though they could work for the same newspaper rather than ones 
3000 miles apart Johnson and Buckley each offer damning verdicts on CBS’ 
original decision to suspend David Rooney for suggesting too many “homosexual 
unions” was a problem for America. Whilst both defend Rooney’s statement, they 
are more concerned with the supposed growing power of the gay rights 
movement and the influence it can exert. Buckley suggests that rather than 
anything to do with homosexuals themselves, “what is more portentous is that 
the casual ascription of bigotry has become a routine part of American life.”64 Six 
years earlier Colin Welsh had expressed similar fears about “the way in which 
homosexual activists have, as I said, advanced boldly, immodestly, proselytising 
and demanding ever new 'rights', privileges, ells and so on.”65 To these writers, 
the gay rights movement was apparently synonymous with gay “privilege.” The 
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closest that either paper came to a statement which calls for a policy relating to 
homosexuals (as opposed to actively wanting no policy) was Taki’s call in The 
Spectator for New York and San Francisco to close down their bathhouses. 66 
Yet in the vast majority of cases the newspapers feature articles expressing a 
general distaste for homosexuality and opposition to its entering the public 
sphere, alongside a general toleration of its existence in the private sphere.  
A remarkable aspect of the coverage of gay rights in either newspaper is the 
consistency of the attitudes expressed in the writing. The only major change is 
that AIDS becomes a more common theme as the decade goes on. Yet the 
growing discovery of AIDS as being a disease which hits homosexuals most of 
all did not trigger either a more sympathetic or harsher attitude to homosexuality 
on either side of the Atlantic.67 The difference is that slightly more articles were 
written about gay rights in the later eighties as the gay liberation movement grew, 
with groups such as the Aids Coalition To Act Up gaining greater press traction.68 
This interesting combination of traditional Conservative attitudes and neoliberal 
freedom of choice did not exist with abortion. Abortion was perceived as falling 
outside of such bounds because it was viewed as killing; no amount of toleration 
could be allowed for killing. 
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The starting position of Conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic was that 
abortion was wrong in all circumstances.  Richard Neuhaus expressed this view 
in the National Review69 in 1989 and Mary Kenny the same in The Spectator in 
1987.70 One of the major issues which both Britons and Americans wanted to 
tackle was the presentation of abortion as a women’s issue. Neuhaus suggests 
that it is a purely moral question of “the weighting of a human life against the 
reasons for terminating that life” as opposed to a gender-related one.71 Likewise 
a Spectator editorial in the run up to a major vote on term-limits at Westminster 
tries to debunk the idea it is a ‘women’s issue’, noting that left-wing female 
members of the press such as Polly Toynbee used this as a stock line, despite 
polling showing that abortion is far more popular with men than women.72 The 
way in which this issue was separated from others is well demonstrated by 
Johnson’s expressed horror at the phrase “right to choose” on the grounds it 
suggests that having children is merely another consumer choice. 73Given the 
aforementioned significance of consumer choice to the Conservative Movement 
this is particularly significant; abortion was outside the scope of capitalism to the 
bulk of the New Right. Paul Johnson emphasised this in his attack on the phrase 
“right to choose” being associated with abortion.74 
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That said, Conservative commentators were not totally unaware of political 
realities and as such there are examples of them compromising. Once again, 
however, this applies in equal measure on either side of the Atlantic, with Kenny 
noting what an improvement eighteen weeks would be on twenty-eight in the 
United Kingdom and Buckley any kind of cut in the USA.75 Indeed, it is interesting 
how politicised abortion was in both National Review and The Spectator given 
that abortion time limits were unchallenged in the UK for a decade up to 1987 
and it was deemed to be a judicial rather than legislative question in the USA 
from 1973 to 1988.76 The relative lack of religious emphasis in either the United 
Kingdom or United States also indicates that what was once a religious issue had 
developed into a partisan one 
 
Conclusion 
Conservatives in the United Kingdom and United States had a great amount in 
common during the nineteen-eighties. Reflecting the closeness of their 
Conservative heads of governments, and the relative similarities in the policies 
pursued by those governments, the writers in National Review and The Spectator 
advocated very similar things throughout the period.  
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The introduction set out three different ways to examine trans-Atlantic elements. 
The first, namely interest in the policy of the other nation, was most clearly 
reflected in economic policy, particularly policy relating to taxation and public 
spending. Supply-side economics was probably the single biggest change that 
the Thatcher and Reagan governments made, and thus perhaps it is unsurprising 
that this comes across as the most overwhelmingly important aspect of 
Conservatism in these newspapers. Both The Spectator and National Review 
offered vast amount of column inches to support for supply-side transitions in the 
other country, as well as even more in their own. What the difference in coverage 
granted to foreign supply-side economics over issues such as labour relations or 
social issues indicates is that Conservatives themselves saw this as the most 
important issue of the day. Looking at how the two papers covered the other 
country, it is apparent that from an Atlantic perspective radical economic reform 
was what mattered most within Domestic policy. Conservatives in America cared 
a great deal about economics in Britain; they were less concerned by education 
policy. 
What the analysis in this paper also highlights is how similar was the ideology of 
Conservatives on either side of the Atlantic. The repeated emphasis on 
competition in arguments relating to regulation, privatisation, trade union and 
even education highlights how wedded most Conservatives of the era were to the 
neoliberal ideas first put forward in the thirties and continually advanced by the 
likes of Hayek. Even if they were not consciously aware of the fact, which the 
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regular references to neoliberals suggests they were, the Conservative 
columnists who dominated these newspapers were imbedded with neoliberal 
ideas.  
 This is made clearer still by the passion expressed for the supply-side economic 
reforms which were transforming both countries for most of the titular period. 
Likewise, the almost identical attitudes expressed on the major social issues of 
women’s rights, gay rights and abortion highlight how neoliberalism influenced 
Conservatives. In this area the critical influence of neoliberalism was toleration. 
The focus on freedom ensured that even the most hardline anti-homosexuals 
such as The Spectator’s Auberon Waugh did not advocate reintroducing anti-
sodomy laws. Rather, the focus of Conservative opposition became the “rights” 
groups which sought greater recognition and more equitable representation in 
the public sphere.  
The focus on Conservative newspapers rather than politicians seems to be 
particularly significant. Whilst they did wish to be influential and there were 
obvious constraints of decency, The Spectator and Salisbury Review had no 
electoral concerns. Therefore, the fact they focus on competition rather than 
unwinding the welfare state and on rejecting the gay rights movement rather than 
homosexuality itself is hugely telling. The ideological picture of Conservatives 
which this paper paints of neoliberal economics combined with elements of 
traditional conservatism and a libertarian streak is more believable because it is 
based mainly on newspapers. If the lip-service paid by Conservatives to the right 
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of homosexuals to practice privately was false, then one would expect to see 
newspapers such as these calling for more radically anti-gay policies than they 
did.  
The level of inter-governmental entanglements and influences covered in this 
paper were few, mainly because the vast majority were over foreign policy. 
Those that did emerge domestically (based mainly on the knowledgeable 
coverage of the two newspapers) were about economics. These showed that on 
the practicality of supply-side economics if nothing else, there was clear trans-
Atlantic influence. Reagan was boosted by Thatcher’s electoral success; it 
boosted his faith in Reaganomics.  
It appears that there were trans-Atlantic elements to the Conservative Movement 
in the nineteen-eighties. These elements were not universal across different 
sections of policy or attitude. Whilst there was indeed a striking similarity in the 
views on domestic issues, including social issues, on either side of the Atlantic, it 
was only in neoliberal economics where there is clear evidence of governmental 
influence. In addition, it was neoliberal economics where active support for the 
other country to adopt Conservative policies was noticeable. Neoliberal ideas 
came from Hayek, Ropke and many others, and lacked national constraints. As 
such they heavily influenced Conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic, 
resulting in neoliberalism being the most powerful, though not the only, common 
ideological feature.  
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Liberal International? The American takeover of London’s Spectator 
Newspaper 1859-1861. 
 
London’s Spectator newspaper in the period 1859 to 1861 illuminates two major 
elements of Anglo-American political relations. Firstly, it draws attention to how 
America was looked upon favourably by British Liberals. It establishes that by the 
late 1850s it was not merely radicals in Britain who looked benignly upon 
America’s greater sense of classlessness and democracy. Secondly, it helps to 
illustrate how Liberal Party and Democratic Party ideology overlapped in that era 
of the nineteenth century.  From early 1859 to early 1861 The Spectator was 
remarkable because of its proprietors. They were a pair of London-based 
Americans, Benjamin Moran and James McHenry. Moran worked in the 
Buchanan Administration’s London office as Assistant Secretary to the Minister 
to Great Britain. During this period the magazine’s American coverage was 
turned on its head, with its former hostility to the Buchanan administration being 
transformed into positive coverage bordering on the sycophantic.  
The Anglo-American relationship is probably the bilateral relationship most 
covered by historians. Numerous periods of the so-called “special relationship” 
have been explored, ranging from investigations into the nature of British 
influence on the earliest colonists in the 17th century to attempts to decipher the 
nature of the Bush-Blair relationship. Comparatively little has been done 
comparing political attitudes and ideologies in the two countries in the mid-
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nineteenth century. When analysis has been done, the focus has often been on 
governmental rather than ideological relations, such as Lehmkhul and Schmidt’s 
book.77 In their introduction to a collection of essays on Anglo-American relations, 
Leventhal and Quinault suggest that “the national bias of each country’s 
historiography and history curricula has ensured the neglect of Anglo-American 
connections after the United States became independent of Britain.”78 Much of 
the comparative political analysis of the nineteenth century has ignored the 
period running up to the Civil War. For instance, Patricia Lee Skyes’ Presidents 
and Prime Ministers attempts to see parallels between crucial liberal figures on 
either side of the Atlantic, but skips from Andrew Jackson and Sir Robert Peel to 
Grover Cleveland and William Gladstone. 79Similarly, Kelley’s The Transatlantic 
persuasion: The Liberal-Democratic Mind in the Age of Gladstone mainly covers 
the post-civil war period.80 Importantly, Kelley’s piece does address the 
compatibility of Liberal and Democratic party politics, though mostly in the post-
civil-war era and focusing mainly on Democratic admiration for Gladstone. There 
has been too little scholarly attention paid to this connection with trans-Atlantic 
focus often being on American Whig admiration for Britain.81 The Spectator from 
1859 to 1861 helps to illustrate how similar Liberal values in Britain were to 
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Democratic ones in America, though this was complicated by slavery. During 
Buchanan’s Presidency, despite the ideological overlap, British Liberals tended 
actively to oppose Buchanan because of his anti-abolitionist position, The 
Spectator was unique amongst Liberal papers in its support for him.  
In the late 1850s both American and British politics had recently undergone 
major political realignments. In the first part of the decade the American Whig 
party had collapsed and the opposition to the Democratic Party became greatly 
fractured, with the nativist and anti-Catholic Know-Nothings emerging alongside 
other regional parties. The Democratic Party was the most successful of the era 
and James Buchanan was elected on the Democratic ticket in 1856. By 1858 the 
anti-slavery Republican Party had become entrenched as the Democrats’ main 
rivals and the question of slavery policy was dominating American politics. 
American politics became more sectional because of this. Whether a 
congressman was a southerner or northerner, an abolitionist or slaver, came to 
matter more and issues such as immigration, trade and taxation became less 
salient as slavery and the existence of the Union came to fore. In the 1850s, 
based on DW Nominate scores, this sectionalism became the greatest predictor 
of how a Congressmen would cast their votes.82  Buchanan sought to maintain 
unity in the country which was bitterly divided over the slavery issue. He failed to 
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do so and the slave states became increasingly alienated, eventually seceding in 
1861 with the Republican Abraham Lincoln’s victory in the Presidential election.  
British politics in the era was chaotic also. Party labels had always been less 
meaningful in Britain, with no official parties on ballots and Members of 
Parliament choosing the group with which they wanted to be associated. The 
withdrawal from the Conservative block by Prime Minister Robert Peel and one 
hundred of his allies in 1846 had further complicated matters, leading to a series 
of brief governments under various banners. A sense of stability returned as the 
Liberal Party emerged as a dominant force in the late 1850s, becoming a formal 
group in 1859. The Liberals were broadly the party of greater representation for 
non-elites, free enterprise and opposition to privilege, in contrast to the 
Conservatives who sought to maintain the existing social and religious order.  
 The Spectator was founded in 1828 by Robert S. Rintoul. He would go on to be 
proprietor-editor for thirty years. It had a Liberal outlook from the start, a notable 
early example of this perspective being its demands for the passage of the Great 
Reform Act with the legendary headline “the bill, the whole bill, and nothing but 
the bill.”83 From the beginning it  was a success, the 1857 Newspaper Press 
Directory describing it thus: “This journal, for twenty-seven years, has occupied a 
leading position amongst the weekly press of the metropolis.”84  The magazine 
has had remarkable longevity, currently being the longest continuously publishing 
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English language magazine in the world. Its politics shifted in the late nineteenth 
century however and it is now by far Britain’s best known weekly magazine with a 
conservative political outlook.  
Yet despite the remarkable longevity there have been relatively few attempts to 
analyse its history. Two articles and a monograph provide the bulk of the 
historiography,85 with the occasional reference in press histories. The period of 
American ownership which this paper will seek to address is an especially 
notable hole in the history of the newspaper because William Beach Thomas was 
not aware of it when he wrote his monograph on the first century of the 
magazine. Malcolm Woodfield refers to the period but focuses on a subsequent 
proprietor. Richard Fulton’s article is the only major piece on this intriguing period 
in the newspaper’s long history.  
In late 1858 the London press was, with the exception of the Times, critical of the 
Buchanan administration. Buchanan’s refusal to take a hostile view of slavery 
was anathema to most of the British press. There was also a sense that the 
growing sectional resentment in the United States was down to a lack of 
leadership on the part of Buchanan.86  At this time The Spectator came up for 
sale and via a proxy in the form of The Spectator writer Thornton Hunt two 
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Americans were able to purchase the paper for 4,200 pounds. Significantly, the 
President who was receiving the hostile press was James Buchanan, the 
previous Minister to Great Britain and the man whom Moran had first served as 
secretary.87  
The Buchanan administration’s paper in London 
That McHenry and Moran’s ownership of the newspaper transformed its 
coverage of Buchanan’s Presidency is undoubtable. The shift in the paper’s 
attitude towards the President from the final pre-American ownership issues in 
late 1858 and the start of their proprietorship was remarkable. Before the 
Americans took over the paper The Spectator was damning in its criticism of 
Buchanan. Detailed policy criticisms were few, but it offered stringent objections 
to the power of slavery in American politics. In late 1858 it took delight in noting 
how the policy of Buchanan “will be reversed by any successor” and that “Public 
opinion has pronounced against it” at the Congressional elections.88 A few weeks 
beforehand The Spectator accused the executive branch of the American 
government of being “at the orders of the southern oligarchy” and generally 
deserving of scorn for damaging the liberty which had previously defined 
America.89 One of the final issues before the ownership changed hands was the 
Christmas Day edition of 1858 in which Buchanan’s State of Union Address was 
described. It was dismissed as “verbiage” and it was claimed that “never before” 
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had the tool of “regular elections” been used to emphasize the frustration of the 
people during a “Chief ruler’s” reign. 90 This was a reference to the losses 
sustained by Buchanan’s Democratic party in the Congressional elections of 
1858. 
The hostility of these articles make the subsequent pro-Buchanan slant of The 
Spectator under McHenry and Moran all the more apparent. Compare the 
aforementioned reaction to his State of the Union address in late 1858 to that of 
1859. Reporting on it in early 1860, The Spectator argued “The Message 
delivered to Congress on the 27th of December is a document of unusual 
ability.”91 The magazine was consistently and aggressively pro-Buchanan. When 
a Congressional Committee was investigating him for potential corruption, the 
paper dismissed them as partisans, claiming “It must be borne in mind that in all 
countries whose Government is based upon a popular suffrage, whether in 
Europe or America, it is the custom for the opposition or " the outs,' to attack the 
Government.”92 In the same article Buchanan was hailed as “that President who 
has alone displayed the capacity, the courage, the will, and the elevated national 
virtue, to administer the affairs of the Republic for the Republic.”93 The paper 
claimed that Buchanan’s pro-union, anti-abolitionist leadership was rescuing 
America in a time of potential crisis. In similar circumstances the following year 
they expressed sympathy for Buchanan and hostility to John Covode and the 
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committee on public expenditure on which he had taken a leading role in 
publishing a report accusing the President of wrongdoing.94  
Enemies of Buchanan’s of course were not limited to Opposition or Republican 
politicians. He broke with fellow Democrat Stephen Douglas and what Kenneth 
Stampp refers to as the “Young America” wing of the Party.95 Young America 
was a strongly nationalistic, northern group of the Democratic party who, whilst 
not abolitionist, was less wedded to supporting slavery than Buchanan. They 
were contrasted with doughfaces; northerners like Buchanan who supposedly 
had southern principles. The Spectator under Moran and McHenry decried the 
disunity in the Democratic Party, but it attributed no blame to Buchanan. It 
pointed to “Judge Douglas” as a culprit, a man had who had “a peculiar personal 
ambition” which led him “to speculate in a policy of hostility to Mr. Buchanan.”96 
The paper went a step further in their coverage of the 1860 election, accusing 
Douglas of having “seceded from his party” unlike the “purely Democratic 
candidate” Breckenridge.97 The paper also attempted to downplay the 
significance of Douglas and his allies within the party, referring to him as “a 
demagogue, and the leader of a small section of the Democratic Party” (in fact 
Buchanan had won nearly thirty percent of the popular vote to Breckinridge’s 
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eighteen).98 According to The Spectator Buchanan was a standout president: 
“We believe, however, that we are simply stating a fact when we say that Mr. 
Buchanan's immediate predecessors had not altogether reached the standard 
which he has restored.”99  
Seemingly out of support for the Buchanan administration the paper was 
determined to downplay the chances of secession. Following Lincoln’s election, 
they suggested he would in reality pursue a moderate course and that the 
doomsayers predicting the end of the Union were worrying far too much, as 
proven by the success of the Constitutional Unionist Bell in some upper southern 
States.100 A week before the South Carolinian Senators resigned their Senate 
seats The Spectator ruled out the possibility of secession. 
The pro-Buchanan shift of the newspaper cannot be said to reflect a general 
move in his favour either in British liberal circles or amongst the London Press. 
This is perhaps best reflected by the first issue after the Americans McHenry and 
Moran sold The Spectator to Meredith Townsend. Having been steadfastly 
defended in the January 5th and January 12th editions of The Spectator,101 under 
new ownership the paper panned him, referring to him as “The American 
Bourbon.” It declared of secession “For this fearful complication no man is more 
answerable than Mr. Buchanan.” They went on to suggest that if Buchanan had 
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shown this “small amount of determination...four months ago” he “might have 
saved the union” and “would have saved his reputation and the honour of the 
national flag”, the implication being that both were ruined. 102 
Before the Americans sold the newspaper in early 1861 The Spectator was 
possibly more pro-Buchanan than any newspaper in the United Kingdom or 
United States. The British press, except The Times, had been lined up against 
him throughout his time in office. He had never been able to count on much of 
the Northern Press in the USA and as the crisis of southern separatism got 
worse he lost his tepid southern support also.103 Supporters of slavery 
expansion, abolitionists and all of those in between could agree that Buchanan 
had either acted wrongly or failed to arrange a compromise to keep these diverse 
groups together. Yet The Spectator continued to present him as a valiant figure 
doing all he could in the face of adversity and treachery, claiming “secessionists” 
had “warped the conduct of Mr. Buchanan.”104  
Why? Moran’s diary gives a clear indication that he held Buchanan at least 
partially responsible for the impending collapse of the Union, stating “I am at 
times disposed to look upon this great evil as the work to a large extent of Mr. 
Buchanan.”105. One can infer that it was one or a combination of personal, 
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partisan, professional and patriotic reasons. Moran had been under-Secretary to 
Buchanan when the latter had been the Minister to London and was also a 
Pennsylvania Democrat. He continued in the role under Buchanan’s successor, 
meaning that throughout his period as an owner of The Spectator he was 
working for the State Department in London, giving him both professional and 
patriotic connections to the administration.  Moran’s diary entry of January 9th 
partially hinted at the power of his personal links to Buchanan, stating that The 
Times’ decision to charge Buchanan with the destruction of the Union “is not 
unfounded” but that he had “ever loved Mr B.”106 
  
Was Fulton Right? 
It has been established that under the stewardship of McHenry and Moran The 
Spectator was exceptionally pro-Buchanan. Indeed, Ricard Fulton claims “From 
early 1859 to early 1861, The Spectator’s commentary on American affairs read 
like a Buchanan administration propaganda sheet.”107  
Fulton’s piece is largely informative and insightful. However, two aspects of his 
conclusion seem to rely too heavily on speculation and ought to be challenged. 
Firstly, Fulton contends that the American ownership of the newspaper was “one 
small dimension of how the Buchanan administration tried to influence the British 
government, into a sympathetic view of the administration’s policy toward slavery 
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and the Southern independence movement.”108 There is a distinct lack of 
evidence directly linking the Buchanan administration to Moran’s joint ownership 
of The Spectator. Probably, it was a personal enterprise.  
Fulton does not present any evidence regarding the acquisition from a member 
of the Buchanan administration beyond Moran’s own diary. Furthermore, Moran’s 
partner McHenry was an American businessman in London unconnected to the 
administration. Fulton did have access to the diary of George Dallas, the former 
vice-president who was the American Minister to Great Britain whom Moran 
served as assistant secretary in this period. There was no indication of contact 
from Washington regarding buying a British paper. He does reference Moran’s 
diary statement in 1858 that “we are now without a journal in England, except the 
Times” in regard to the question of slavery.109 If this suggests anything significant 
it seems to be that Moran was a believer in the Buchananite position of granting 
concessions to the south over slavery. This could be drawn upon as evidence 
that genuine partisan political feeling made him want to influence the British 
press via a newspaper.  
The other claim of Fulton’s which should be challenged is that “owning The 
Spectator clearly paid political dividends to the Buchanan administration.” What 
were these political dividends? Fulton argues they were twofold. Firstly, that the 
many important liberals who read the magazine would have been influenced by 
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its “American direction,” 110 and secondly that The Spectator coming out fervently 
against the abolitionist cause and in favour of Buchanan influenced the rest of 
the British press. One problem with both of these theories is that there was rarely 
more than one article a week discussing American politics and on many 
occasions, including the first two weeks of American ownership, none at all. It 
seems even less probable that the American government would take the effort to 
arrange the purchase of a paper only to have it regularly ignore American affairs.  
He paraphrases Alvar Ellegard’s description of Spectator readers, writing that 
they were “liberal in politics, MPs, peers, professional people, and businessmen, 
both in England and the colonies- in other words, the decision-makers and 
opinion makers of the realm.”111It seems fanciful to suggest that one of many 
prominent weekly papers (alongside a number of dailies and semi-regular radical 
pamphlets) could have had much of an influence. The Liberal MPs reading the 
paper would have been reading other papers too. Furthermore, we do not know 
the circulation of the paper, only that it declined under Moran and McHenry’s 
ownership based on Moran’s diary entries112 and Beach Thomas’ very bare 
summary of the period.113  
The idea there was a shift in the London Press on slavery thanks to The 
Spectator is also challengeable. He acknowledges that The Times was the only 
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other paper to support the relatively pro-slavery position of Buchanan.114 Thus 
his claims regarding influence on other papers, which he acknowledges are 
“coincidence, possibly” rely on a particular example of the Saturday Review 
moderating their criticisms of the administration from 1859 to 1860 and then 
returning to criticise it once The Spectator was sold. Yet The Spectator was sold 
at the same time as the Civil War was breaking out; every British newspaper was 
condemning the Union government and getting behind the southern rebels. 
 
Liberals and America 
Party labels were self-applied in Britain until the 1880s and the first formal 
meeting of the Parliamentary Liberal Party was in 1859. What historians refer to 
collectively as the Liberal Party was thus largely loose and varied collection of 
self-styled Whigs and Radicals. Even after its foundation in 1859 it was 
significantly less defined and organised than either of the main American parties. 
Broadly, Radicals were more fervent advocates of change and opponents of 
privilege. Whigs generally advocated steady reforms to the constitution, whilst 
Radicals called for immediate changes to be made in favour of greater 
democracy. Radicals also tended to come from a more evangelical, non-Anglican 
religious background. Whilst Radical continued to be a label attributed to 
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politicians throughout the nineteenth century, by the late 1850s almost all Whigs 
and Radicals referred to themselves as part of the Liberal Party. Liberalism in 
this era was defined by support for a small state and a reduction in government-
based privileges. As such Liberals, whether they came from a Whig or Radical 
background, supported low taxation, low public spending, tolerance of religious 
dissenters and above all free trade. These values made them and the American 
Democrats natural bedfellows. 
The Spectator was in the late 1850s very much a part of the Liberal mainstream. 
Beach Thomas’ history of the paper emphasises that it was always a relatively 
unpartisan Liberal paper, noting how when it was started in the 1830s it “backed 
the Whigs when they pursued the course of justice and good sense, and roundly 
abused them for any sign of back-sliding.”115  The former Whigs and Radicals 
(plus some Peelites116) were all now part of the Liberal party. The Spectator had 
offered support to elements of all three of these of groups previously and was 
clearly supportive of the Liberal Party in this era and the few years preceding it. It 
could thus fairly be said to be in the mainstream of British Liberalism.  
In Spectator articles about the United States not overwhelmingly concerned with 
partisan issues (which focused on support for Buchanan) there was a strong pro-
American emphasis. Part of this played to nationalistic concerns, emphasising 
that America and Britain shared a common heritage and race.  The Spectator 
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endorsed Richard Cobden’s claim that “in the event of any danger to this country, 
nothing could prevent the great bulk of the population in the United States 
hurrying to the rescue of the old mother-country.”117 There were also numerous 
allusions to the importance of the nation’s common Anglo-Saxon heritage and its 
role in political culture, for instance in September 1860 an article contrasted 
Mexican’s “foreign habits in their political affairs” with the upstanding nature of 
the “Anglo-Saxon Republic” of the United States.118  
The Spectator also shows how there was a great deal of Liberal admiration for 
America’s more democratic politics.  There has been considerable scholarly 
attention paid to American Whig admiration for the moderation of the British 
constitution by the likes of Howe.119 Sexton suggests that Whigs “could not 
conceal their admiration of Britain.”120 There has been less attention paid to the 
positive attitude of British Liberals toward America. Quinault suggests 
“Americans regarded British politics as aristocratic, whereas Britons thought 
American politics were democratic.”121 This seems to be accurate but does not 
fully explain the situation. Because of these stereotypes, the more aristocratic 
American Party (the Whigs and their descendants) and the more democratic 
British party (the Liberals) looked longingly across the Atlantic. The famous 
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British writer Trollope addressed the phenomenon in his 1867 political novel 
Phineas Finn, in which the arch-liberal Turnbull was described, among other 
things, as having “almost idolatrous admiration for all political movements in 
America.”122 When British attitudes have been considered, they have tended to 
focus on earlier Radical admiration for the United States’ supposed 
classlessness and egalitarianism. Epstein notes how powerful the idea of 
America as a land of liberty remained for British radicals in the 1840s, suggesting 
that for them, “America remained a place of dreams, of populist yearning. The 
vision of the western republic based on the free yeoman farmer- free from 
religious, economic and social controls- died hard.”123  
Yet The Spectator’s stated admiration for various elements of American politics 
and political history between 1858-61 shows that by then fondness for the United 
States was a Liberal trait, not merely a radical one. The Spectator noted how the 
American revolution was inspired by English history, suggesting “We can 
scarcely understand how General Washington could have been trained to his 
great duties, if he had not had the precedent of Cromwell."124 They went on in 
that issue to endorse the principles of the American revolution, stating “the most 
loyal Englishman…..can scarcely blame the American citizens because they 
construed the British Constitution better than King George and his Ministers 
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did.”125 The paper did not merely accept that the Americans were within their 
rights to rebel against British rule, but also praised the United States as a major 
positive influence on the case for reform in Britain, stating “we have some 
difficulty in defining the amount of debt which our Reform agitators owe to those 
who so well illustrated Constitutional principles in the British Colony across the 
Atlantic.”126 
The Spectator’s overwhelmingly positive coverage of the United States (when not 
considering partisan political questions) did not reflect a radical attitude at the 
paper from 1859-61. As stated, it was a paper in the mainstream of British Liberal 
politics. Nor was it merely a reflection of the biases of its owners, as was its 
support for Buchanan.127 Rather, it is evidence of how “Americanised” the Liberal 
Party of the late 1850s had become. What had once been considered radical 
positions on the franchise were now in the Liberal mainstream and this meant 
that the more democratic United States was viewed in a positive light by almost 
all Liberals.   
One of the most significant elements in the formation of the Liberal Party was the 
decline in the influence of the aristocratic Whig attitude which emphasised the 
need for strict franchise restrictions. It is not that these aristocratic Whigs 
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disappeared from the party, a useful illustration of this being that the first two 
Liberal Prime Ministers were Viscount Palmerston and Earl Russell. Rather, what 
were once exclusively radical demands for wider suffrage permeated the party so 
that from the mid-1850s franchise expansion was supported by the vast majority. 
Every Liberal government from 1859 until 1922, attempted to pass a bill which 
expanded the size of the British electorate.  
Thus a more “American” attitude favouring wider political representation was 
dominant within British Liberalism as a whole. It became common to associate 
Liberal and American attitudes on the subject. . The Conservative Party leader 
Disraeli suggested Gladstone’s 1866 Reform Bill, which sought to reduce the 
property qualification for voting, was an attempt to replace the British constitution 
with an American one.128  
The Spectator shows that representation was not the only issue where Liberal 
and American values overlapped. In common with the entirety of mainstream 
American politics in the era, it criticised various forms of “direct taxation,” 
expressing concern at the level of both property and income tax and expressing 
the hope that Britons would not “endure a heavy burden of direct taxation after 
our defensive labours shall have been completed.”129 In the United States the 
direct taxes The Spectator opposed were not merely unpopular but 
unconstitutional. Whilst offering broad praise for Gladstone’s 1860 budget it 
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expressed concern that he had maintained income and property taxes while 
abolishing various indirect taxes.130 Furthermore, in late 1859 they criticized a 
radical proposal to reform the system of taxation and base it entirely on the value 
of property owned by an individual. They insisted that a just tax system was not 
merely based on extracting the most out of those with money, but on people 
paying for what they used. What would later be termed laissez-faire 
predominated.131  
 
Liberals and Democrats 
The Spectator combined a strongly partisan, pro-Democratic party attitude with 
support for Liberal politics. That these elements were able to co-exist without 
ideological contradictions or even much tension is a strong indication that there 
was an ideological closeness between these two political movements. Indeed, 
the only volte-face made by The Spectator in the aftermath of the takeover 
McHenry and Moran was in its coverage of Buchanan and the sectional conflict 
which dominated American politics at the time. At the least this indicates that the 
Democratic and Liberal movements were not natural enemies.  
The Spectator’s combination of support for Buchanan and Liberal politics in 
Great Britain supports the theory put forward by the likes of Kelley that the 
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American Democrats and British Liberals were ideological bedfellows.132 The 
Spectator’s attitude to the significant issues of representation, taxation, public 
spending, and public morality shows that Liberals and Democrats shared a good 
deal of common ground. Central to both parties’ ideology was a belief that there 
needed to be firm limits on the power of the state, on the influence of elites and 
that the popular will ought to have great influence of political affairs. They also 
had a shared belief in keeping public spending and taxation low, as well as 
scepticism of the government pursuing great moral crusades. Although their level 
of commitment to free trade was unequal, they were also both the anti-
protectionist parties in their respective nations.  
Howe has noted how historians have identified a “common liberalism” between 
the two nations, in particular focusing on the admiration for Gladstone from many 
American Democrats and for Edwardian New Liberals by the Progressive 
Republicans of the early twentieth century.133 Sykes is an excellent example. She 
argues that all successful, “conviction style” leaders in both the United Kingdom 
and United States “articulate similar ideas, ones that adapt liberal ideology to suit 
changing circumstances.”134 Whilst history has focused on later leaders, there is 
also evidence for Liberal ideas and sympathies crossing the Atlantic in the mid-
19th century. James Epstein, examining the British press coverage of the death of 
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Andrew Jackson in 1845, noted how much positivity there was for him from 
radical papers such as the Northern Star, which portrayed him as a heroic man of 
the people. Their obituary depicted him next to the recently deceased former 
British Prime Minister Earl Grey and invited readers to contrast the two men in an 
editorial entitled “The Republican and the Aristocrat contrasted”, in which they 
sang the praises of the Democratic President and the political system he 
endorsed which “invests sovereignty in the people .135  By contrast, the more 
conservative paper the Globe condemned him for surrendering to the populace’s 
“universal thirst for an actual share in power”, leaving America to resemble 
ancient Athens. Here once again the complicated origins of British Liberalism are 
in evidence. Significantly, it was the radical attitude to sovereignty which came to 
dominate British Liberalism.   
On occasion the policy beliefs of the two parties slightly differed. Yet they shared 
resoundingly similar views. In his work on the American Whig Party, Howe notes 
how the American Review described the two main American political parties in 
1846: “There is a law and order, a slow and sure, a distrustful and cautious party- 
a conservative, a Whig party; and there is a radical, innovating, hopeful, boastful, 
improvident and go-ahead party- a Democratic, a Loco-Foco Party!”136 This 
dichotomy is one which Howe and Holt are both keen to emphasise. Howe 
rejects the term “liberal” regarding American Whigs based on their “moral 
absolutism, paternalism and preoccupation with discipline” but is happy to use 
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“conservative.” There is a wealth of evidence to support Howe’s case. The 
eighteenth century Tory Lord Bolingbroke137 was an inspiration to Whigs and the 
future Republican Secretary of State Seward was able to rouse a Whig meeting 
by evoking Bolingbroke’s authority on the need “to regenerate the first principles 
of the constitution.”138 Howe suggests both that the “decline of deference” felt 
threatening to Whigs and that their fondness for Burke showed “how important 
their conservatism was to them.”139 Ronald Quinault is keen to point out that 
whilst historians such as Laski and Basler speak of Lincoln as one of the key 
figures in the nineteenth century Democratic tradition, Lincoln at no point 
referenced Democracy in a speech or writing and in 1836 endorsed a tax-based 
franchise that excluded many.140 This evidence adds to the case that a major 
aspect of American Whiggery was to conserve the existing order, a goal which 
had always existed in British Toryism but which Robert Peel’s Tamworth 
Manifesto of 1834 made an explicit goal of the British Conservatives. He 
explained it as a response to a fear of “a perpetual vortex of agitation.” A 
potential challenge to the relevance of this apparent association is that the Whigs 
had ceased to exist for several years by the time Moran and McHenry took 
charge of The Spectator. Yet here, in Lincoln and Seward, there are examples 
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from the first Republican President and his greatest rival for the primary and 
Secretary of State. This is an illustration of how influential former Whigs were in 
the new Republican Party. Most Republicans had been Whigs and the majority of 
Lincoln’s cabinet were ex-Whigs. Whilst not a direct continuation, the 
Republicans were on the same side of the political divide as Whigs on most 
issues.  
Fiscal policy is another area where The Spectator highlights the ideological 
similarity of Democrats and Liberals. In both its British and American coverage 
the paper calls for governments to be more restrained in their spending. The 
paper praised Buchanan’s call in his state of the Union Address of 1859 for 
American public spending to be curtailed.141 It was also totally consistent in its 
calls for British public spending and taxation to be kept low. When the 
Conservative Party was briefly in power under the leadership of Lord Derby at 
the start of 1859 The Spectator launched an attack on Disraeli’s “miserable” 
budget, concurring with John Bright’s attack on the government’s 711 million 
pounds of revenue from taxation as being too high.142   
The Spectator under Moran and McHenry draws attention to how laissez-faire 
attitudes to economics predominated in the British Liberal movement of this era. 
That was this combined with an aggressive support for James Buchanan and the 
Democratic Party, without desperate explanations for policy differences being 
                                                           
141 The Spectator, 14 January 1860:3.  
142 The Spectator, 12 March 1859:4.  
72 
 
necessary (his policies were pretty consistent with what The Spectator advocated 
for the British economy), draws attention to the ideological consistency of the 
Democratic and Liberal parties.  
The Spectator reflects a non-moralising style of politics which came to dominate 
the mainstream of the Liberal Party. They shared the Democratic party’s more 
laissez-faire attitude to governmental moral restrictions. The paper offered a 
freedom-centred defence of boxing (at the time a sport with strict restrictions), 
arguing that “Sayers and Heenan will fight, it is certain” and decrying “the 
busybodies” who “hunt them from county to county.”143 The paper’s support for 
the bill against Church Rates was argued not from an anti-establishment (of the 
Church of England) position but rather on the grounds people should not be 
compelled to pay for something they do not believe in: “it is a proof of obstinate 
infatuation to argue that Dissenters should be compelled to pay for the support of 
a Church from which they have seceded for conscience' sake.”144 In its support 
for the rights of the individual over the state as a moral arbiter on religious and 
moral issues, The Spectator shows that the Liberal mainstream’s attitude to such 
issues resembled those of the Democratic mainstream. The Democrats were the 
party which Catholics turned to prevent Yankee evangelical dominance of 
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education and civil society.145A laissez-faire approach predominated, as it did on 
fiscal policy.  
This also suggests that ethno-cultural historians such as Hays and Holt have 
under-valued ideology in their analyses of ethno-religious question and 
politics.146 The religious make-up of the Democratic and Liberal parties was very 
different, yet their opposition to state-support for religion was similar as was their 
lack of interest in pushing policies based on religious moral positions, such as 
restricting vices. This cannot have been culturally based. The radical, non-
conformist wing of the Liberal Party had a great deal in common religiously with 
the Republican Party and there were very few Catholics or anti-confessional 
Protestants (who made up the bulk of the Democratic Party) in Britain. Thus the 
commonality of Democratic and Liberal moral and religious policy can be put 
down to a common ideological perspective rather than cultural links.  
Free trade was one of the defining features of Liberal politics in this era. It was a 
policy which united all of the disparate groups of the Liberal Party together. Thus 
it is unsurprising that The Spectator was a resolute supporter of free trade from 
the late 1820s until deep into the twentieth century. The paper admitted in 1860 
that “For our own part, we do not hesitate to say that we look upon free trade as 
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a benefit which can never be carried to excess.”147 They also launched a 
stringent attack on ship-owners who were “asking for hostile tariffs.”148  
 In spite of Franklin and other founding fathers advocating free trade, it was a 
policy which divided America and the mother country for most of the nineteenth 
century.149 The Democrats of the late 1850s were not avowedly anti-
Protectionist. Howe notes how a number of historians who have argued for a 
common liberalism between the United States and Britain in the nineteenth 
century have focused on Democrats’ regard for Gladstone, but suggested that 
“this mutuality fell short of common adherence to free trade.”150 Howe draws 
attention to free trade links between the two countries, focusing on American 
societies such as the Philadelphia Free Trade Convention and writers such as 
W.C. Bryant as evidence of how a free-trade movement was maintained in the 
US.151 The Spectator provides primary evidence of this. In its reports of Richard 
Cobden’s 1859 trip to America it notes how the “touching attentions” he received 
whilst being known as the “great champion of free trade” show that “rightly 
represented, free trade finds in free America no ungenial welcome.”152 
                                                           
147 The Spectator, 1 September 1860:13.  
148 The Spectator, 10 December 1859:11.  
149 A. Howe, “Free Trade and the International Order: The Anglo-American Tradition, 1846-1946, 
Anglo-American Relations:142. 
150 Ibid: 143. He uses R. Kelley, The Transatlantic Persuasion: the Liberal-Democratic Mind in the 
Age of Gladstone (New York, 1969) and H. C. Allen and R .Thompson (eds), Contrasts and 
Connections: Bicenntennial Essays in Anglo-American History (London, 1976), p. 245-70 as 
examples.  
151 Ibid: 144-6.  
152 The Spectator, 2 July 1859:5.  
75 
 
Yet Howe ignores the partisan element of the American free trade debate. Whigs 
and later Republicans were wedded to the tariff as a source of revenue. 
Significantly, the biggest reduction in the tariff for decades was Buchanan’s Tariff 
Act of 1857. Ironically, The Democrats were not a free trade party. Their views 
varied considerably; Buchanan famously complained of being assailed as a 
villain by both wings of his party on the issue. Yet in the context of the United 
States, where Republicans remained committed to raising revenue from the tariff, 
the Democrats were the more free-trade party. Given how central debates over 
tariffs were to British and American politics this is vitally important to 
understanding the connection between the Liberals and the Democrats. 
The Spectator’s reports of Cobden’s visit to America illustrate that it was 
Democrats who were far more amenable to his anti-protectionist arguments. 
Following his visit, a Massachusetts Democrat named D. B. Bradford wrote 
letters to much of the British press, including The Spectator, about how brilliant 
Cobden’s speeches were. He also claimed that Buchanan had eventually hosted 
Cobden in the White House for four days, so much did he enjoy his company.153  
The Democrats were the only party with anything in common with Liberals on 
free trade. No Republican-controlled newspaper could have so extolled the 
virtues of free trade. The Spectator, controlled by Democrats, opted to 
emphasise the potential in American for free-trade support, rather than explaining 
the case for protectionism.  
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The Spectator of 1859-61 addressed relatively few American political issues 
directly. The sectional battle over slavery utterly dominated its American 
coverage. The Spectator makes clear that the Buchananite attitude towards 
slavery had nothing to do with its merits and all to do with the maintenance of the 
Union. They condemned Governor Wise of Virginia as making “drunk” 
statements about the potential for the Union to end in 1860.154 They also mocked 
former Navy Secretary James Paudling of New York for being a pro-slavery 
northerner “when even the South was ashamed of that institution.”155  
More significantly, the manner in which the paper expressed its support for 
Buchanan’s anti-abolitionist position shows that there was at least some liberal 
justification for it. It demonstrates that whilst slavery was by this time a uniquely 
American issue, Democratic support for the “peculiar institution” did not totally 
undermine the party’s Liberal credentials. Given how the goal of the paper’s 
American coverage was to advance the cause of James Buchanan, it is hardly 
surprising that it pinned the blame for the growth in the sectional divide between 
North and South on his Republican opponents and Democrats such as Douglas 
who were more willing to compromise. Yet the paper did not opt to explain the 
slavery debate by dismissing it as “peculiar institution” that was tied into the 
uniqueness of America. In part, its intense focus on the question of the Union’s 
future meant that the actual debate was downplayed and the emphasis placed on 
how slavery was necessary for the survival of America. However, they also 
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attacked Republican abolitionists for ignoring the constitution and the property 
rights of slave-owners. In an apparently subtle attempt to link the Republican 
Party with the Conservative Party they claimed “the Abolitionist party in the 
United States has to a great extent continued the course originated by the old 
Tory party…it is to a great extent hostile to the constitution.”156 It also appealed to 
property rights, accusing abolitionists of ignoring them, in contrast to the British 
abolitionists of an earlier era.157 Significantly, this shows that regardless of the 
overwhelming British Liberal support for abolition in this era, Liberal arguments 
predicated on self-determination and civil liberties could be put forward. Despite 
their attitude to abolition the vast majority of British Liberals supported the 
Confederate cause (Gladstone referred to them as having “made a nation”158) 
once the Civil War broke out. The Spectator’s attempts to justify what became 
Confederate positions demonstrate that there was an ideological foundation for 
Liberals to back a non-abolitionist position.  
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Conclusion 
The Spectator of McHenry and Moran is a fascinating and useful source. It adds 
to the historiography of Buchanan’s Presidency and of the history of the State 
Department. More significantly, it is a source which illuminates Liberal admiration 
for the United States and the ideological similarities between Britain’s Liberal 
Party and America’s Democratic Party in the lead up to the American Civil War.  
The Spectator’s proprietors’ sycophantic support for Buchanan reveals both that 
some support for his Presidency existed and that loyalty to his administration was 
firm in the American office in London. Yet the reality that this paper was the only 
one in Britain (The Times offered tepid support rather than outright hostility like 
other papers), and one of the very few anywhere, to offer such support, is 
particularly damning. If it does not reflect on his failures as President, it must 
reflect on a catastrophic failure of presentation to the public. In order for a paper 
to be in favour of James Buchanan’s Presidency, it had to be owned and run by a 
member of his administration from the same county in Pennsylvania who had 
worked directly for Buchanan before his election!  
Regarding ideology, The Spectator’s content adds support to Robert Kelley’s 
thesis that the Democratic and Liberal parties were natural bedfellows (though 
Kelly pays little attention to the years 1859-61). Liberal ideology, as it was in the 
1850s, was remarkably compatible with support for James Buchanan. A large 
aspect of that was the laissez-faire attitude shared by Democrats and Liberals to 
fiscal and moral policy. Critically, both parties served as the anti-protectionist 
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force in their politics and Buchanan was notably strong on this issue. Even on 
slavery, despite the general Liberal abhorrence, The Spectator’s support for the 
continued existence of slavery in America shows that an anti-abolitionist (though 
not pro-slavery) position was not incompatible with a generally Liberal ideology. 
There were some Liberal arguments to endorse such a position. The Liberal and 
Democratic Parties fit well ideologically, there was also a more general fondness 
for America as a land of less privilege and more equality amongst British 
Liberals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
